\n\u201cA contrary interpretation would impair the Secret Service\u2019s ability to protect its charges,\u201d Judge Cornelia Pillard wrote in the majority opinion. \u201cIt would require Secret Service agents preventing members of the public from encroaching on a temporary security zone to confirm that each intruder knows that a person under Secret Service protection is or is expected to be there. Neither the text nor the context of the statute supports that reading.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Griffin also argued that many of the rioters ahead of him trampled fencing and signage that would have designated restricted areas, but the panel held that Capitol grounds were \u201cadequately \u2018posted, cordoned off or otherwise restricted\u2019 when Griffin clambered over a stone wall and jumped inside.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Judge Gregory Katsas wrote in a dissenting opinion that both elements of the law \u2014 knowledge of an area being restricted and the reason why \u2014 must be satisfied to successfully convict for entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cMy colleagues try to split the difference,\u201d Katsas wrote. \u201cThey agree the defendant must know that the relevant area satisfies the first part of the statutory definition \u2014 i.e., that the area was \u2018posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted\u2019 at the time of the trespass. But there is no textual or contextual basis for projecting the knowledge requirement only halfway through the definition.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
A decision in favor of Griffin could have upended the cases against hundreds of fellow rioters facing the same charge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
More than 1,400 Jan. 6 rioters faced the count as a misdemeanor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is a breaking news story. Please check back for updates.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n