Pentagon Reveals Records On Operation That Could Have Prevented 9/11
After nearly two decades of courtroom arguments, the Defense Department has finally turned over records on an intelligence program that could have prevented the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The non-profit public interest law firm Judicial Watch announced in a statement after a nearly 19-year Freedom of Information Act battle, “the Department of Defense produced 62 pages of records out of hundreds of previously withheld documents regarding the U.S. intelligence program ‘Operation Able Danger.’ The Defense Department identified hundreds of pages of responsive records but withheld them, claiming the overwhelming majority are still classified to this day.”
“It shouldn’t take two decades to decide that the American people can’t see documents about a military investigation that could have prevented 9/11. What an insult to the American people and the victims of 9/11,” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton.
“Able Danger was formed in 1999. It compiled publicly available information regarding al Qaeda and other targets,” Judicial Watch notes.”
“In August 2005 interviews, Tom Fitton, president of Judicial Watch, and other experts reported that the operation identified four future September 11, 2001, hijackers as al Qaeda members in the United States well before the attacks,” Judicial Watch states, adding, “The Senate Intelligence Committee began its investigation of the program in August 2005. In September 2005, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on Able Danger, however, members of the data-mining team were blocked from testifying.”
That’s when Judicial Watch stepped in, submitting a FOIA request to Defense Department for related records, as well as information on “U.S. intelligence, law enforcement and/or counterterrorism projects and/or programs utilizing data mining software/techniques to search open-source records in the public domain.”
Judicial Watch lays out what they discovered, writing:
The Defense Department response on August 24 from U.S. Special Operations Command identifies hundreds of pages of responsive records but claims the overwhelming majority are still classified and, over 20 years later, remain exempted from disclosure:
[S]pecifically, Sections 1.4(a), military plans, weapon systems, or operations; 1.4(c), intelligence activities (including covert actions), intelligence sources or methods, or Cryptology; 1.4(g), vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security; and Section 1.7(e), for compilation of items of information that are individually unclassified, but may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship.
The records obtained by Judicial Watch include an unredacted, declassified Top Secret/SCI record contains a 17-page listing of unclassified, open-source internet resources listing websites and URLs for topics such as terrorism news stories; Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism; and “Albanian Terrorism in Kosovo,” among many others. Across the bottom of page three of the lists of open-source records is a statement: “Began to understand the status of ongoing efforts!” The author of the exclamation is not identified.
Small passages of what seem to be declassified Top Secret/SCI analytical reports (unnamed and undated) feature commentary such as:
Arab countries in North Africa especially, Algeria, Tunisia, Morrocco, Libya, Egypt, and almost all other Arab countries have been annoyed for the high profile of Osama bin Laden first in Pakistan and later in Afghanistan especially, when he publicly claims that he trains Arab fundamentalists to overthrow most of Arab regimes in the Middle East.
The records also cite journalist Jason Burke’s December 1998 reporting that Osama bin Laden decided to get into drug trafficking as a new weapon and approached (through intermediaries) major opium and heroin dealers, as well as major landowners in the opium-growing districts of Afghanistan, and offered to buy all of the opium they grow.
Drug trafficking was also featured in an undated/unsourced, declassified TOP SECRET/SCI record that stated:
In fact, heroin is the major source of income for the Taleban [sic] government that has seized power in Afghanistan. It is not the Taleban government alone; heroin is also a major source of earning for the Inter Service Intelligence ISI of Pakistan, which has been providing support and assistance for the Taleban government which has seized power in Afghanistan. The lion’s share of the funds earned through heroin smuggling is spent on intelligence service and also on subversive activities carried out by the ISI in neighboring countries.
Another undated/unsourced excerpt states:
Opium is traded at large bazaars in Afghanistan that are the treacherous domain of criminal syndicates. One of the more notorious is located in the town of Sangin, a three-hour drive west of the Taliban capital of Kandahar. ‘Sangin is known as a dangerous place,’ says Bernard Frahl, head of the U.N. drug-agency office in Islamabad, who visited the market town in October. “It is known for people going in and not coming out.” Of about 500 shopkeepers crowded along one main street, and two or three footpaths off it, he says, almost half sell opium.
“The records produced to Judicial Watch include the homepage of a Swedish construction firm and what appears to be a worker complaint from someone employed in Saudi Arabia,” Judicial Watch adds.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of American Liberty News.
Fix The NSC: A Warning & Roadmap For Trump’s Second Term
A Call to Action: Reforming the National Security Council
Joshua Steinman, the former senior director for cyber on President Trump’s National Security Council (NSC), has issued a stark warning to the incoming president that demands immediate attention. Steinman, who loyally served from Trump’s first day in office to his last, cautions that mistakes in NSC staffing could spell disaster for the administration’s second term, leading to either ineffectiveness or outright betrayal. His insights form a compelling argument for a complete overhaul of the NSC as the cornerstone of Trump’s efforts to govern effectively.
The NSC, as Steinman explains, is not merely a bureaucratic appendage. It is the quarterback of the White House—the entity tasked with ensuring that the president’s directives are executed seamlessly across the vast machinery of the federal government. “If the president is the owner of the football team, the NSC is the quarterback,” he asserts, underscoring the centrality of this institution in driving the administration’s policy agenda. And yet, Steinman’s concerns suggest that the team surrounding this quarterback may not be up to the task.
Reflecting on Trump’s first term, Steinman identifies a critical error: the decision to retain approximately 50% of the NSC staff from the Obama administration. This hesitation to implement a sweeping purge, according to Steinman, allowed disloyal actors to undermine Trump’s policies. Some of these holdovers allegedly continued to operate under Obama-era guidance until explicitly instructed otherwise. Steinman’s message is clear: “Removing people like this isn’t personal; it’s just prudent.”
The stakes are high. Steinman contrasts Trump’s initial approach with the swift and decisive action taken by President Biden, who executed a comprehensive purge of Trump-aligned NSC staff upon taking office. This move ensured that Biden’s team could implement his agenda without interference from ideological adversaries. Critics labeled Biden’s actions a “purge” and raised concerns about the politicization of traditionally non-partisan roles, but his administration’s determination to align its personnel with its policies proved effective in consolidating its power.
Steinman’s critique does not stop at holdovers. He raises alarms about new hires, questioning their loyalty and expertise. Among those rumored to join Trump’s team is Adam Howard, GOP Staff Director for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), who is set to take the critical role of senior director for intelligence programs. Steinman questions whether Howard’s background equips him to confront potential interference from the intelligence community—a task vital to ensuring Trump’s agenda is not derailed.
The urgency of Steinman’s warning lies in the fundamental truth that personnel is policy. For Trump’s administration to succeed, the NSC must be staffed with individuals who are not only loyal to his vision but also possess the subject-matter expertise to navigate the complexities of their roles. Steinman’s concerns about Anne Neuberger, the Biden-appointed NSC cybersecurity director, exemplify this need. Her alignment with policies on artificial intelligence and tech censorship could undermine Trump’s objectives, should she remain in place.
Trump’s response to these challenges is beginning to take shape. Key appointments to his NSC include:
While these appointments reflect a renewed emphasis on loyalty and alignment, Steinman’s cautionary tale lingers. The success of Trump’s second term hinges on avoiding the missteps of the first. The NSC’s ability to serve as an effective quarterback depends entirely on the quality of its staff. As Steinman aptly puts it, “The Intel Senior Director position is one of the most CRITICAL posts in U.S. Government.”
The broader implications of Steinman’s warning extend beyond Trump’s presidency. The debate over Biden’s NSC purge highlighted the tension between ensuring policy alignment and maintaining non-partisan governance. Critics, including the Heritage Foundation, argued that Biden’s actions undermined the apolitical nature of advisory roles, while supporters contended that loyalty is essential for effective governance. Trump’s administration must navigate this delicate balance, prioritizing mission alignment without descending into the partisanship that critics decry.
As Trump prepares to assume office once more, the lessons of his first term and Biden’s purge are clear: the NSC must be reimagined, restructured, and resolutely loyal to the President’s agenda. Failure to act decisively could jeopardize the very goals Trump has championed—from ending unnecessary conflicts to revitalizing the economy. Steinman’s call to action is both a warning and a roadmap: “Fix the NSC, fix the presidency.”
Sponsored by the John Milton Freedom Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to helping independent journalists overcome formidable challenges in today’s media landscape and bring crucial stories to you.